Answer in brief
CVE-2026-81315 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in MCP DNS-rebinding origin check in AshAi is bypassed by a spoofed X-Forwarded-Proto header. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash_ai (generic), ash-project/ash_ai (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ash-project/ash_ai (generic), ash-project/ash_ai (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project/ash_aigeneric | >=0.8.0 <1.0.0 | 1.0.0 |
| ash-project/ash_aigeneric | >=c94f0b17fbe252f68755ba512678586164ba6139 <28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21 | 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21 |
Published upstream
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 31, 2026
Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server's DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user's local MCP server with that user's actor. In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker's origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.