AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle (CVE-2026-81853) | HOL Guard CVE

Unknown severity · Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-81853

AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-81853 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash_admin (generic), ash-project/ash_admin (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 31, 2026Updated Aug 31, 2026Source checked Aug 31, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 31, 2026Material review Aug 31, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability: Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps ash-project/ash_admin (generic), ash-project/ash_admin (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
ash-project/ash_admingeneric	>=0.1.0 <1.3.1	1.3.1
ash-project/ash_admingeneric	>=98b03baa8422b94dd13e305bf08b8ee3f7232c7b <3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a	3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for ash-project/ash_admin, ash-project/ash_admin.
Review the reported fix. Update ash-project/ash_admin to 1.3.1; ash-project/ash_admin to 3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Aug 31, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Upstream source description

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes. AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.