Answer in brief
CVE-2026-81853 records a Low severity (CVSS 2.3) vulnerability in AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash_admin (generic), ash-project/ash_admin (generic), ash-project/ash-project/ash_admin (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 2.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ash-project/ash_admin (generic), ash-project/ash_admin (generic), ash-project/ash-project/ash_admin (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project/ash_admingeneric | >=98b03baa8422b94dd13e305bf08b8ee3f7232c7b <3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a | 3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a |
| ash-project/ash_admingeneric | >=0.1.0 <1.3.1 | 1.3.1 |
| ash-project/ash-project/ash_admingeneric | >=98b03baa8422b94dd13e305bf08b8ee3f7232c7b <3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a | 3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a |
Published upstream
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 31, 2026
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes. AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.