Answer in brief
CVE-2026-82727 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in AshPhoenix Form.Auto leaks submitted params in an unknown _union_type error message. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash_phoenix (generic), ash-project/ash_phoenix (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ash-project/ash_phoenix (generic), ash-project/ash_phoenix (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project/ash_phoenixgeneric | >=1.2.17 <2.3.25 | 2.3.25 |
| ash-project/ash_phoenixgeneric | >=a3436fcc321e3b34c242cceaf62c3c92bc1a452b <0c1775c3cf8988f9abd10a8f92315afc5f06f16d | 0c1775c3cf8988f9abd10a8f92315afc5f06f16d |
Published upstream
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 31, 2026
Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix writes the entire raw submitted param map into an exception message, so secrets submitted alongside a union form field leak into logs, crash reports and the dev error page. When AshPhoenix.Form.Auto builds a union sub-form and the submitted _union_type does not match a configured type, both raise sites built the message with inspect(params, pretty: true), embedding the full untrusted param map, and also inspected the internal union constraints[:types]. Because the message is constructed by the library rather than Phoenix's parameter logger, config :phoenix, :filter_parameters never redacts it. An attacker controls both the trigger and the contents: submitting %{"_union_type" => "nope", "password" => "..."} puts the password verbatim in the raised message. The fix reports only the offending _union_type and the valid type names, dropping the param and constraints dumps. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 1.2.17 before 2.3.25.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.