Answer in brief
CVE-2026-82735 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.9) vulnerability in Match regex runs on over-length input in Ash.Type.String, enabling regex denial of service. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash (generic), ash-project/ash (generic), ash-project/ash-project/ash (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ash-project/ash (generic), ash-project/ash (generic), ash-project/ash-project/ash (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project/ashgeneric | >=05848d5f4affe60fddd812222a18ada080c0813b <14928412a1a94a69c47df8e98920d3a2b09cdec4 | 14928412a1a94a69c47df8e98920d3a2b09cdec4 |
| ash-project/ashgeneric | >=0.10.0 <3.32.2 | 3.32.2 |
| ash-project/ash-project/ashgeneric | >=05848d5f4affe60fddd812222a18ada080c0813b <14928412a1a94a69c47df8e98920d3a2b09cdec4 | 14928412a1a94a69c47df8e98920d3a2b09cdec4 |
Published upstream
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 1, 2026
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to force an expensive regular expression to run on input that a length constraint should have already rejected. Ash.Type.String.apply_constraints/2 (lib/ash/type/string.ex) evaluated the :match regex regardless of the min_length and max_length constraints on the same attribute. Because the length check did not gate the regex, an over-length value that the length constraint rejects still had the pattern applied to it, so the length limit that would otherwise bound the work never constrained the regex input. Against a backtracking pattern this yields catastrophic regex evaluation on attacker-sized input, and even a linear pattern runs on arbitrarily large input, consuming CPU per request. The fix skips the :match regex whenever a length constraint is violated, making the two checks order-independent. This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.32.2.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.