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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 8.3CVE-2026-84170

Apache Wicket: Configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resourceCVE-2026-84170

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-84170 records a High severity (CVSS 8.3) vulnerability in Apache Wicket: Configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resource. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.wicket:wicket-core (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Nov 1, 2026Updated Nov 1, 2026Source checked Nov 2, 2026First seen by HOL Nov 1, 2026Material review Nov 1, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 8.3
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 8.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.wicket:wicket-core (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.wicket:wicket-coregeneric>=9.14.0 <=9.24.0 || >=10.0.0 <=10.9.1Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.wicket:wicket-core.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Nov 1, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Nov 1, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Nov 1, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencelists.apache.org
Upstream source description

Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.AbstractFileUploadResource is the server side of the form-less upload offered by FileUploadToResourceField, which posts the selected files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a Form. The resource is an application-wide singleton with no component to consult, so newResourceResponse() takes the three limits that bound the upload - the total request size, the maximum size of a single part and the maximum number of parts - from the request parameters maxSize, fileMaxSize and fileCountMax, and hands them to the multipart parser as they arrive. Nothing binds those numbers to the field that is supposed to be uploading. A request naming a very large maxSize is therefore parsed with no effective ceiling on the total size, and omitting fileMaxSize and fileCountMax leaves the per-part and part-count limits unset as well. The values the application configured through FileUploadToResourceField#setMaxSize(), #setFileMaxSize() and #setFileCountMax() are consulted only when the client omits the corresponding parameter, so against a client that supplies one they have no effect at all. Parts above the parser's in-memory threshold are spooled to the container's temporary directory, and the file parts are then copied into the folder the application's IUploadsFileManager owns, under a sub-folder the request names, where they remain. A part that is not a file is read into the heap in full while the request is parsed. One request, repeatable, can therefore consume as much disk or as much heap as the client chooses to send. The resource carries no authorization annotation and the default authorization strategy permits every resource request, so unless the application authorizes the resource itself the request needs no authentication, no session, no prior page view and no user interaction. An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, or mounts FileUploadResourceReference itself. This is not the ordinary upload path: the resource is a singleton that has to be created and mounted deliberately. An application that configures no upload limit at all loses nothing, because Wicket applies no total-size limit of its own by default; what the defect removes is a limit the application set. Uploads through Form with FileUploadField, and through AjaxFileDropBehavior, are not affected, because both read their limits from the component rather than from the request. The upload resource does not exist in the 8.x line. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.9.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • Apache Wicket: XSS via a resource bundle text written unescaped into generated JavaScript and markupSame apache software foundation/org.apache.wicket package
  • Apache Wicket: A disabled or invisible form submitting component is still invoked on a plain form submissionSame apache software foundation/org.apache.wicket package
  • Apache Wicket: A listener is invoked on a page instance the request itself created and never configuredSame apache software foundation/org.apache.wicket package
  • Apache Wicket: The configured authorization strategy is not applied to an IResource embedded in a componentSame apache software foundation/org.apache.wicket package
  • Apache Wicket: A cross-origin listener invocation stopped by a login wall is replayed after the user signs inSame apache software foundation/org.apache.wicket package
  • Apache Wicket: XSS in AjaxNewWindowNotifyingBehavior via the client-supplied window nameSame apache software foundation/org.apache.wicket package

Record context

Vulnerability class
Missing Auth
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-770
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Nov 2, 2026
References
1 linked source
Open source record