Answer in brief
CVE-2026-85237 records a High severity (CVSS 8.6) vulnerability in Missing Rate Limiting in Email OTP Verification Allows Brute-Force Authentication Bypass. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps misp/misp (generic), misp/misp (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.6. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps misp/misp (generic), misp/misp (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:misp-project:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| misp/mispgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
| misp/mispgeneric | >=0 <=2.5.45 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 3, 2026
A vulnerability in MISP's email-based one-time password (OTP) authentication flow allowed an attacker to perform an unrestricted number of OTP verification attempts. The email_otp() endpoint did not apply brute-force protection when validating submitted OTP values. An attacker who had reached the OTP verification stage, for example after successfully providing a user's primary authentication credentials, could repeatedly submit candidate OTP values while the same OTP remained valid. This significantly increased the feasibility of guessing the OTP and bypassing the additional authentication factor, potentially resulting in unauthorized access to the affected user's account. The issue was exacerbated by the fact that the OTP is associated with the user rather than with an individual pending login session, allowing multiple concurrent sessions to attempt guesses against the same valid OTP. The patch integrates the existing MISP brute-force protection mechanism into the email OTP flow. Failed OTP attempts are now counted against the user, further attempts are rejected once the configured threshold is reached, and the active OTP is invalidated when the attempt budget is exhausted. Blocklisted users are also prevented from requesting the generation of a fresh OTP. In addition, OTP comparison now uses hash_equals() and validates that the submitted value is a string.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.