Answer in brief
CVE-2026-86041 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP & API token) is bypassable via a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps mayswind/ezbookkeeping (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps mayswind/ezbookkeeping (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| mayswind/ezbookkeepinggeneric | >=0.10.0 <1.6.0 | 1.6.0 |
Published upstream
Nov 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 4, 2026
ezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forwarded-For value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an allowlisted address to bypass the mcp_allowed_remote_ips or api_token_allowed_remote_ips gate. A valid MCP or API token remains required for protected actions. When such actions occur, the same spoofed value is stored in Transaction.CreatedIp and the request log, attributing activity to the trusted host instead of the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.