Answer in brief
CVE-2026-86338 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Ash field policies do not filter-nil forbidden calculations and aggregates, enabling an information-disclosure oracle. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash (generic), ash-project/ash (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ash-project/ash (generic), ash-project/ash (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project/ashgeneric | >=2.11.0-rc.0 <3.33.4 | 3.33.4 |
| ash-project/ashgeneric | >=0b6d93c7c4637280b46ae66ea1d2eaf013701238 <b3d4503241f3deacb5ceb955e10a4fa927da0f67 | b3d4503241f3deacb5ceb955e10a4fa927da0f67 |
Published upstream
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 16, 2026
Ash field_policies are documented to protect against filter-based information disclosure: when a field the actor may not see is referenced in a filter, it is replaced with an expression that evaluates to nil, so a filter cannot be used as a yes/no oracle to read a value the actor cannot see. This nilling was applied to attributes but not to calculations or aggregates. A user-supplied filter reference to a calculation or aggregate carries an Ash.Query.Calculation / Ash.Query.Aggregate struct, which the authorizer's reference replacement did not match (it only matched the Ash.Resource.* structs), so the filter ran against the real value. As a result, an actor whose field policies forbid a calculation or aggregate can still filter by it (for example filter(secret_calc == "x") or filter(comment_count == n)) and learn the value from whether rows match — an oracle that recovers field-policy-protected values one probe at a time. Filtering is commonly exposed to lower-privileged actors (for example via AshGraphql or AshJsonApi filter arguments), which is exactly the surface field policies are meant to protect. The fix routes filter references to calculations and aggregates through the same field-policy nilling as attributes. This issue affects ash: from 2.11.0-rc.0 before 3.33.4.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.