Answer in brief
CVE-2026-87082 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl hang, crash or return a wrong label via unvalidated malformed UTF-8 in encode_punycode. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Affected software not mapped in the current feed; confirm the named product and version against your inventory.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
Affected software not mapped in the current feed; confirm the named product and version against your inventory.
Published upstream
Sep 22, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 22, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 22, 2026
Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl hang, crash or return a wrong label via unvalidated malformed UTF-8 in encode_punycode. Neither backend checks that its input is well-formed UTF-8, so a string with the UTF-8 flag set over malformed bytes, as the :utf8 PerlIO layer produces from any malformed input, reaches the encoder unchecked. On perl 5.32 and later the XS backend reports a malformed sequence with a length of `(STRLEN)-1`, so the scan steps back one byte instead of forward and never ends. On earlier perls the XS returns a valid label for a different name. The pure-Perl backend runs a regex over the flagged string. Depending on the bytes, it aborts with SIGBUS on perl 5.28 and later, dies with a panic, or returns a wrong label. The documented conversion functions match the label against Unicode properties first and that match dies on such a string, so only a direct call to encode_punycode reaches the defect. The decoder is not affected. A direct caller encoding attacker-supplied bytes hangs, crashes or gets a label for a name the input never held.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.