### Impact Versions of ExifReader from 4.20.0 through 4.38.1 do not bound the size of decompressed metadata blocks. When a caller invokes the asynchronous API (e.g. `ExifReader.load(file)` or `ExifReader.load(buffer, {async: true})`) on an attacker-supplied image, a small compressed chunk in the file can expand to hundreds of megabytes of memory, consuming heap and CPU until the process slows down or runs out of memory. The affected paths share a single decompression utility, so the issue is reachable through any compressed metadata block the library handles asynchronously, including: - PNG `zTXt`, compressed `iTXt`, and `iCCP` chunks (deflate) - JPEG XL Brotli-compressed Exif and XMP blocks A typical proof of concept produced roughly 1000× expansion (for example, ~32 KB of compressed input expanded to ~32 MB of output, ~130 KB to ~128 MB). Both the npm package and the `dist/` bundle published from this repository (consumed by Bower and other users of the prebuilt artifact) are affected. ### Patches Fixed in **4.39.0**. The decompression utility now reads the decompressed stream incrementally and aborts as soon as the running total would exceed a configurable limit. The default cap is **128 MiB** per metadata block, which is well above any realistic legitimate value. When a block exceeds the cap, that block is skipped (a warning is emitted via `console.warn`) and the remaining tags are returned as usual. The cap is configurable via the new `maxDecompressedSize` field on the `decompress` option, in bytes: ```javascript const tags = await ExifReader.load(file, { async: true, decompress: { maxDecompressedSize: 16 * 1024 * 1024 // 16 MiB } }); ``` The same cap applies to results returned by user-supplied custom `brotli`/`deflate` functions. ### Workarounds - If upgrading is not possible, avoid invoking the asynchronous API on untrusted inputs. The synchronous code path skips compressed metadata blocks entirely and is not affected. Alternatively, pre-validate input files by source or size before passing them to ExifReader. ### Resources - Patch: https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/commit/5f116128adc19f674902f8bf582bfe7dd0a36375 - README — "Limiting decompressed metadata size": https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/blob/main/README.md#limiting-decompressed-metadata-size
### Impact Versions of ExifReader from 4.20.0 through 4.38.1 do not bound the size of decompressed metadata blocks. When a caller invokes the asynchronous API (e.g. `ExifReader.load(file)` or `ExifReader.load(buffer, {async: true})`) on an attacker-supplied image, a small compressed chunk in the file can expand to hundreds of megabytes of memory, consuming heap and CPU until the process slows down or runs out of memory. The affected paths share a single decompression utility, so the issue is reachable through any compressed metadata block the library handles asynchronously, including: - PNG `zTXt`, compressed `iTXt`, and `iCCP` chunks (deflate) - JPEG XL Brotli-compressed Exif and XMP blocks A typical proof of concept produced roughly 1000× expansion (for example, ~32 KB of compressed input expanded to ~32 MB of output, ~130 KB to ~128 MB). Both the npm package and the `dist/` bundle published from this repository (consumed by Bower and other users of the prebuilt artifact) are affected. ### Patches Fixed in **4.39.0**. The decompression utility now reads the decompressed stream incrementally and aborts as soon as the running total would exceed a configurable limit. The default cap is **128 MiB** per metadata block, which is well above any realistic legitimate value. When a block exceeds the cap, that block is skipped (a warning is emitted via `console.warn`) and the remaining tags are returned as usual. The cap is configurable via the new `maxDecompressedSize` field on the `decompress` option, in bytes: ```javascript const tags = await ExifReader.load(file, { async: true, decompress: { maxDecompressedSize: 16 * 1024 * 1024 // 16 MiB } }); ``` The same cap applies to results returned by user-supplied custom `brotli`/`deflate` functions. ### Workarounds - If upgrading is not possible, avoid invoking the asynchronous API on untrusted inputs. The synchronous code path skips compressed metadata blocks entirely and is not affected. Alternatively, pre-validate input files by source or size before passing them to ExifReader. ### Resources - Patch: https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/commit/5f116128adc19f674902f8bf582bfe7dd0a36375 - README — "Limiting decompressed metadata size": https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/blob/main/README.md#limiting-decompressed-metadata-size
Update exifreader to 4.39.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanExifReader is vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded decompression of image metadata affects exifreader (npm). Severity is medium. ### Impact Versions of ExifReader from 4.20.0 through 4.38.1 do not bound the size of decompressed metadata blocks. When a caller invokes the asynchronous API (e.g. `ExifReader.load(file)` or `ExifReader.load(buffer, {async: true})`) on an attacker-supplied image, a small compressed chunk in the file can expand to hundreds of megabytes of memory, consuming heap and CPU until the process slows down or runs out of memory. The affected paths share a single decompression utility, so the issue is reachable through any compressed metadata block the library handles asynchronously, including: - PNG `zTXt`, compressed `iTXt`, and `iCCP` chunks (deflate) - JPEG XL Brotli-compressed Exif and XMP blocks A typical proof of concept produced roughly 1000× expansion (for example, ~32 KB of compressed input expanded to ~32 MB of output, ~130 KB to ~128 MB). Both the npm package and the `dist/` bundle published from this repository (consumed by Bower and other users of the prebuilt artifact) are affected. ### Patches Fixed in **4.39.0**. The decompression utility now reads the decompressed stream incrementally and aborts as soon as the running total would exceed a configurable limit. The default cap is **128 MiB** per metadata block, which is well above any realistic legitimate value. When a block exceeds the cap, that block is skipped (a warning is emitted via `console.warn`) and the remaining tags are returned as usual. The cap is configurable via the new `maxDecompressedSize` field on the `decompress` option, in bytes: ```javascript const tags = await ExifReader.load(file, { async: true, decompress: { maxDecompressedSize: 16 * 1024 * 1024 // 16 MiB } }); ``` The same cap applies to results returned by user-supplied custom `brotli`/`deflate` functions. ### Workarounds - If upgrading is not possible, avoid invoking the asynchronous API on untrusted inputs. The synchronous code path skips compressed metadata blocks entirely and is not affected. Alternatively, pre-validate input files by source or size before passing them to ExifReader. ### Resources - Patch: https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/commit/5f116128adc19f674902f8bf582bfe7dd0a36375 - README — "Limiting decompressed metadata size": https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/blob/main/README.md#limiting-decompressed-metadata-size
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| exifreadernpm | >=4.20.0,<4.39.0 | 4.39.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate exifreader to 4.39.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanExifReader is vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded decompression of image metadata affects exifreader (npm). Severity is medium. ### Impact Versions of ExifReader from 4.20.0 through 4.38.1 do not bound the size of decompressed metadata blocks. When a caller invokes the asynchronous API (e.g. `ExifReader.load(file)` or `ExifReader.load(buffer, {async: true})`) on an attacker-supplied image, a small compressed chunk in the file can expand to hundreds of megabytes of memory, consuming heap and CPU until the process slows down or runs out of memory. The affected paths share a single decompression utility, so the issue is reachable through any compressed metadata block the library handles asynchronously, including: - PNG `zTXt`, compressed `iTXt`, and `iCCP` chunks (deflate) - JPEG XL Brotli-compressed Exif and XMP blocks A typical proof of concept produced roughly 1000× expansion (for example, ~32 KB of compressed input expanded to ~32 MB of output, ~130 KB to ~128 MB). Both the npm package and the `dist/` bundle published from this repository (consumed by Bower and other users of the prebuilt artifact) are affected. ### Patches Fixed in **4.39.0**. The decompression utility now reads the decompressed stream incrementally and aborts as soon as the running total would exceed a configurable limit. The default cap is **128 MiB** per metadata block, which is well above any realistic legitimate value. When a block exceeds the cap, that block is skipped (a warning is emitted via `console.warn`) and the remaining tags are returned as usual. The cap is configurable via the new `maxDecompressedSize` field on the `decompress` option, in bytes: ```javascript const tags = await ExifReader.load(file, { async: true, decompress: { maxDecompressedSize: 16 * 1024 * 1024 // 16 MiB } }); ``` The same cap applies to results returned by user-supplied custom `brotli`/`deflate` functions. ### Workarounds - If upgrading is not possible, avoid invoking the asynchronous API on untrusted inputs. The synchronous code path skips compressed metadata blocks entirely and is not affected. Alternatively, pre-validate input files by source or size before passing them to ExifReader. ### Resources - Patch: https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/commit/5f116128adc19f674902f8bf582bfe7dd0a36375 - README — "Limiting decompressed metadata size": https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/blob/main/README.md#limiting-decompressed-metadata-size
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| exifreadernpm | >=4.20.0,<4.39.0 | 4.39.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard