CISA ADP Vulnrichment

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-88592 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in CISA ADP Vulnrichment. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps n/a/n/a (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 16, 2026Updated Sep 17, 2026Source checked Sep 18, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 16, 2026Material review Sep 17, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps n/a/n/a (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
n/a/n/ageneric	n/a	Not reported

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for n/a/n/a.
Review the reported fix. Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Sep 16, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

GitHub security advisorygithub.com

Upstream source description

kkFileView >= 4.2.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The cross-origin file proxy endpoint /getCorsFile is protected by TrustHostFilter against the trust.host whitelist. However, the URL parameter validated by the filter is not the same parameter the controller actually fetches: the filter validates the first non-empty parameter in a fixed priority order, while the controller only reads and fetches urlPath. By supplying both urlPath=<real target> and url=<whitelisted decoy address> in the same request, the decoy passes validation while the unvalidated real target is fetched server-side — and the response body is echoed back to the attacker.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.