Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89063 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System <= 28.1 - Insecure Direct Object Reference to Unauthenticated Sensitive Data Access and Message Injection via 'conversation_id' Parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Booklygeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 16, 2026
The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 28.1 via the 'conversation_id' parameter due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the full AI booking conversation transcript of any customer — leaking names, email addresses, phone numbers, and appointment details echoed by the assistant — and inject arbitrary messages into any victim conversation that are subsequently replayed to the Cloud AI worker along with the full private history. Because AI conversations are stored with no owner, user, or session identifier and conversation IDs are sequential integers, an unauthenticated attacker can enumerate all customer conversations simply by incrementing the conversation_id parameter.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.