Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89426 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in Knit Pay <= 9.6.1.0 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation via Gravity Forms Role Field. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps knitpay/Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps knitpay/Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| knitpay/Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and moregeneric | >=0 <=9.6.1.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 25, 2026
The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the `maybe_update_user_role()` function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's `user_role_field_id` — and passing it to `WP_User::set_role()` without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to `$lead['created_by']` — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.