Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89478 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in sctp: drop a chunk if its transport was removed. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <c6c86a5e62a4fec36692ddd64b9144b660f71f96 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <1035bdef1efb9b1076d1a57b81e08c637ff08ecc || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <3537961df2163258bddc230db0e18dc14e925ea6 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <03a9d10ecf71f54b2af8020935f2033d4a132be5 | c6c86a5e62a4fec36692ddd64b9144b660f71f96, 1035bdef1efb9b1076d1a57b81e08c637ff08ecc, 3537961df2163258bddc230db0e18dc14e925ea6, 03a9d10ecf71f54b2af8020935f2033d4a132be5 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.12 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: drop a chunk if its transport was removed sctp_rcv() resolves the transport once per packet and leaves it in chunk->transport. The lookup reference, or the one sctp_add_backlog() takes if the socket is owned by userspace, keeps it around until the chunk has been processed. An authenticated ASCONF DEL-IP can remove it in the meantime. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() takes the transport out of the association and calls sctp_transport_free(), which tags it dead and drops the reference the association held. There is a window on both paths: the packet can sit on the socket backlog, and on the direct path the lookup completes before bh_lock_sock(). The DATA chunk in that packet puts the removed transport back into asoc->peer.last_data_from. Once the packet is done that reference goes away and the transport is freed by RCU, so the next delayed SACK carries the pointer into the SACK chunk and sctp_outq_select_transport() reads the freed transport's state. Drop the chunk in sctp_inq_push(), next to the existing rcvr->dead check. Both paths reach it with the association's socket lock held. The peer retransmits it.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.