Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89488 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=11efd5cb04a184eea4f57b68ea63dddd463158d1 <e15407c3a8a005324f633cd46cd8fb58042c1157 || >=11efd5cb04a184eea4f57b68ea63dddd463158d1 <6a6d36fadb8537d9b79e72c9fa51885ec0c33e10 || >=11efd5cb04a184eea4f57b68ea63dddd463158d1 <403f96c32c9e24600093d7d0c61c17daeedca957 | e15407c3a8a005324f633cd46cd8fb58042c1157, 6a6d36fadb8537d9b79e72c9fa51885ec0c33e10, 403f96c32c9e24600093d7d0c61c17daeedca957 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.18 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free Packet processing uses CT limit state under RCU, while netns teardown frees that state under ovs_mutex. The CT limit pointer was neither removed from readers nor protected by a grace period, allowing packet processing to dereference the freed state. An unprivileged user can trigger this bug from a user and network namespace, causing a slab-use-after-free in ovs_ct_execute() when the netns is torn down. Publish the CT limit pointer through RCU, remove it before teardown, and wait for readers before freeing its contents. Keep ovs_mutex around individual CT limit updates, and use the RCU read-side lock while GET traverses the RCU-protected limit lists. Netns teardown detaches the RCU-protected CT limit state in the pernet .pre_exit callback while holding ovs_mutex. The pernet core guarantees an RCU grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks, so the .exit callback completes the teardown without adding any extra synchronization. The netlink command handlers do not need NULL checks because the userspace netlink socket holds an active reference to its network namespace while a request is processed. The per-netns exit path therefore cannot run concurrently with SET, DEL, or GET for that socket's namespace.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.