Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89494 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in ocfs2: validate lengths in dlm_mig_lockres_handler. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 <f33041906885f96e190cde54e61ddc69de39e3ee || >=6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 <50c4cc9183e11f83427efbf770f54851f4471c02 || >=6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 <a8facb1670b4a0612183198e758d9539ef628ed9 || >=6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 <b54e03d9b3697d25f4a0063cf717d459c5e3ad94 | f33041906885f96e190cde54e61ddc69de39e3ee, 50c4cc9183e11f83427efbf770f54851f4471c02, a8facb1670b4a0612183198e758d9539ef628ed9, b54e03d9b3697d25f4a0063cf717d459c5e3ad94 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.16 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate lengths in dlm_mig_lockres_handler A node receiving a DLM_MIG_LOCKRES message trusts several fields of the peer-supplied dlm_migratable_lockres without validation. num_locks and lockname_len are bounded only on the sending side, and the message is never checked to actually carry num_locks migratable_lock entries. As a result dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[0..num_locks) past the kmalloc(data_len) copy of the message (an out-of-bounds read that ends in a BUG_ON panic), and dlm_init_lockres() copies lockname_len bytes into the fixed 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object (a heap out-of-bounds write). Both are reachable by any node in the domain. Validate these fields right after dlm_grab(), before anything uses them -- including the not-joined error path, which already prints mres->lockname with the unbounded lockname_len as a %.*s precision. Reject the message unless lockname_len <= DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX, num_locks <= DLM_MAX_MIGRATABLE_LOCKS (the bound the sender already asserts), and the payload is large enough to hold the claimed locks. Conforming recovery and migration messages are unaffected.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.