Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89540 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a | f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01, edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489, 3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e, 5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 3.10 | Not reported |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <b3526ae3351968f6726bcbe25d8d09973ad79109 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <7f5bcdc8da15077ebe846c2756a5a17741021410 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <89c8e0733e8c46b7973503f15b1b31a8587d8030 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a | 159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee, b3526ae3351968f6726bcbe25d8d09973ad79109, 7f5bcdc8da15077ebe846c2756a5a17741021410, 89c8e0733e8c46b7973503f15b1b31a8587d8030, f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01, edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489, 3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e, 5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on sn->gssp_lock. Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized struct mutex. create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net) proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", ...) /* dentry live */ init_gssp_clnt(sn) mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock) /* too late */ write_gssp() set_gssp_clnt(net) mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock) /* uninitialized */ gssp_rpc_create(...) sn->gssp_clnt = clnt mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock) The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data() returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the registering thread is preempted there while another task is already opening the freshly published file. register_pernet_subsys() runs in preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are already running. A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled struct mutex. On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a "lock used without init" splat; on a production kernel the fast path acquires the lock via CMPXCHG(owner, 0, current). In the latter case a second writer that arrives before init_gssp_clnt() re-zeroes owner can enter set_gssp_clnt() concurrently, shut down the first writer's clnt while it is still in use, and leak the loser's clnt. Fix by initializing sn->gssp_lock in sunrpc_init_net() so its lifetime matches the sunrpc_net it lives in. sn->gssp_clnt is already NULL from the kzalloc that backs net_generic storage, so the lazy helper is no longer needed; drop init_gssp_clnt(), its prototype, and the call from create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(). sunrpc.ko is a build-time dependency of auth_rpcgss.ko, so sunrpc_init_net() has always run on every netns before any auth_gss pernet init can publish the proc entry.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.