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  4. CVE 2026 89540 sunrpc init gssplock before publishing proc entry
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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.8CVE-2026-89540

sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entryCVE-2026-89540

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-89540 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 11, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Oct 27, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 11, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5af15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01, edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489, 3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e, 5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a
Linux/Linuxgeneric3.10Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <b3526ae3351968f6726bcbe25d8d09973ad79109 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <7f5bcdc8da15077ebe846c2756a5a17741021410 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <89c8e0733e8c46b7973503f15b1b31a8587d8030 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489 || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e || >=030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b <5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee, b3526ae3351968f6726bcbe25d8d09973ad79109, 7f5bcdc8da15077ebe846c2756a5a17741021410, 89c8e0733e8c46b7973503f15b1b31a8587d8030, f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01, edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489, 3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e, 5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01; Linux/Linux to 159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Sep 11, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 11, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on sn->gssp_lock. Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized struct mutex. create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net) proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", ...) /* dentry live */ init_gssp_clnt(sn) mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock) /* too late */ write_gssp() set_gssp_clnt(net) mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock) /* uninitialized */ gssp_rpc_create(...) sn->gssp_clnt = clnt mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock) The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data() returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the registering thread is preempted there while another task is already opening the freshly published file. register_pernet_subsys() runs in preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are already running. A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled struct mutex. On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a "lock used without init" splat; on a production kernel the fast path acquires the lock via CMPXCHG(owner, 0, current). In the latter case a second writer that arrives before init_gssp_clnt() re-zeroes owner can enter set_gssp_clnt() concurrently, shut down the first writer's clnt while it is still in use, and leak the loser's clnt. Fix by initializing sn->gssp_lock in sunrpc_init_net() so its lifetime matches the sunrpc_net it lives in. sn->gssp_clnt is already NULL from the kzalloc that backs net_generic storage, so the lazy helper is no longer needed; drop init_gssp_clnt(), its prototype, and the call from create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(). sunrpc.ko is a build-time dependency of auth_rpcgss.ko, so sunrpc_init_net() has always run on every netns before any auth_gss pernet init can publish the proc entry.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 27, 2026
References
8 linked sources
Open source record