Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89557 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in md: do overflow check for sb->bblog_shift in super_1_load(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=2699b67223aca6b1450fc2f72e40fada952afc85 <75d15738fd33a782606d0dc80cfeff47edf2ddd8 || >=2699b67223aca6b1450fc2f72e40fada952afc85 <3b097416b4cff77285c1f472fc2c4058d8a7554f || >=2699b67223aca6b1450fc2f72e40fada952afc85 <df7d4d011d5ace20699ea948712f09f9ac08924f || >=2699b67223aca6b1450fc2f72e40fada952afc85 <35d522bd32462afcf1981dab6da8a9256c26c1e0 | 75d15738fd33a782606d0dc80cfeff47edf2ddd8, 3b097416b4cff77285c1f472fc2c4058d8a7554f, df7d4d011d5ace20699ea948712f09f9ac08924f, 35d522bd32462afcf1981dab6da8a9256c26c1e0 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 3.1 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: do overflow check for sb->bblog_shift in super_1_load() In super_1_load(), sb->bblog_shift is an __u8 type value loaded from on- disk superblock. It is used for badblocks API badblocks_set() by the following sequence, 1930 rdev->badblocks.shift = sb->bblog_shift; 1931 for (i = 0 ; i < (sectors << (9-3)) ; i++, bbp++) { 1932 u64 bb = le64_to_cpu(*bbp); 1933 int count = bb & (0x3ff); 1934 u64 sector = bb >> 10; 1935 sector <<= sb->bblog_shift; 1936 count <<= sb->bblog_shift; 1937 if (bb + 1 == 0) 1938 break; 1939 if (!badblocks_set(&rdev->badblocks, sector, count, 1)) 1940 return -EINVAL; 1941 } bb->bblog_shit is in range of 0-255, variable sector is 64bit width, for an invalid bb->bblog_shit, it is possible to make sector be overflowed by the following calculation, 1935 sector <<= sb->bblog_shift; Then in turn when call badblocks_set() at line 1939 with the invalid rdev->badblocks.shift set at line 1930, may result an overflow inside _badblocks_clear() in block/badblocks.c. Although there are many places to call badblocks APIs, the non-zero shift value is only used in super_1_load(), other places always use 0 as the shift value. Therefore it is unnecessary to do a general shift value overflow check inside badblock API, and just check here as the caller. This may avoid unnecessary check, make the badblocks API code more simple and elegant.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.