Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89632 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=a158bb66b1373866d9fd5997565a58a573085539 <711cf71300d7992f450600df8864917d3538679f || >=a158bb66b1373866d9fd5997565a58a573085539 <05f78e6cf34ea3a285053bd5999e08e8ac298bd5 | 711cf71300d7992f450600df8864917d3538679f, 05f78e6cf34ea3a285053bd5999e08e8ac298bd5 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=6.6.32 <7.2.4 || >=6.6.32 <7.3-rc1 | 7.2.4, 7.3-rc1 |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr() reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header: buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off); len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */ rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */ if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */ struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len were already validated, but that does not protect against count being smaller than sizeof(*buf). Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.