Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89743 records a High severity (CVSS 7.7) vulnerability in misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <339f19b9a6171289b0e797deb8bda80b9a1fcc30 || >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <29e634a18957acda11383a15ab98a91c4ae9e294 || >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <2aa0fb9c96f894a9c179a48e7522ea6705800adf || >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <808e530654a5354e6df78863a5d61e4d44e67235 | 339f19b9a6171289b0e797deb8bda80b9a1fcc30, 29e634a18957acda11383a15ab98a91c4ae9e294, 2aa0fb9c96f894a9c179a48e7522ea6705800adf, 808e530654a5354e6df78863a5d61e4d44e67235 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.8 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.