Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89743 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <339f19b9a6171289b0e797deb8bda80b9a1fcc30 || >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <29e634a18957acda11383a15ab98a91c4ae9e294 || >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <2aa0fb9c96f894a9c179a48e7522ea6705800adf || >=b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 <808e530654a5354e6df78863a5d61e4d44e67235 | 339f19b9a6171289b0e797deb8bda80b9a1fcc30, 29e634a18957acda11383a15ab98a91c4ae9e294, 2aa0fb9c96f894a9c179a48e7522ea6705800adf, 808e530654a5354e6df78863a5d61e4d44e67235 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.8 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.