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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.8CVE-2026-89763

KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown orderingCVE-2026-89763

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-89763 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 11, 2026Updated Oct 21, 2026Source checked Oct 27, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 11, 2026Material review Oct 21, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
4 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511 || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <2f7541afbc57fe9d26769a22c31d8ce8790c9a19 || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511, 2f7541afbc57fe9d26769a22c31d8ce8790c9a19, 5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a
Linux/Linuxgeneric5.1Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <3d67b4acbfc7af331d887a8efc04bef6573b8a7a || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511 || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <2f7541afbc57fe9d26769a22c31d8ce8790c9a19 || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a3d67b4acbfc7af331d887a8efc04bef6573b8a7a, 753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511, 2f7541afbc57fe9d26769a22c31d8ce8790c9a19, 5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <81dfc6c665547a4e41721b6716f894f263a5e03f || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <3d67b4acbfc7af331d887a8efc04bef6573b8a7a || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511 || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <2f7541afbc57fe9d26769a22c31d8ce8790c9a19 || >=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 <5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a81dfc6c665547a4e41721b6716f894f263a5e03f, 3d67b4acbfc7af331d887a8efc04bef6573b8a7a, 753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511, 2f7541afbc57fe9d26769a22c31d8ce8790c9a19, 5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511; Linux/Linux to 3d67b4acbfc7af331d887a8efc04bef6573b8a7a; Linux/Linux to 81dfc6c665547a4e41721b6716f894f263a5e03f if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Sep 11, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 21, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 11, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown. The current order permits this interleaving: CPU 0 CPU 1 trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted") put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal() kfree(digests) pcrlock() unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests) CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89 Call Trace: tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted] trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted] trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted] __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0 __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50 __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310 Allocated by task 88: __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490 do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390 do_init_module+0x2df/0x840 Freed by task 90: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted] __do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510 Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the backend state is destroyed.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 27, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record