Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89768 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in fs: fix user path of nested backing files. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=5b6aa9a843205da92d860e5011a7b29062a76b8f <88c927a63dc717b6d46b20fe13ea713916e49089 || >=5dfcb15974e7d0f96aca278dd9f1b85df91523ef <c03114634d342648bd34910aa8fb88007e92cc3c || >=6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 <a35cc21355734e1acb89973d9be90ca8e4c3ed2f || >=6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 <f2381b546e7e6a35c9fcee0d0ccb6c042a9aeb5d || 41c5b269af8b1f0bffcab7766a793f294ae6764e || 27e795afba0018b0ea9460dbad4bd706d1ba5ee0 || >=6.12.95 <6.12.109 || >=6.18.38 <6.18.50 || >=6.6.144 <6.7 || >=7.0.4 <7.1 | 88c927a63dc717b6d46b20fe13ea713916e49089, c03114634d342648bd34910aa8fb88007e92cc3c, a35cc21355734e1acb89973d9be90ca8e4c3ed2f, f2381b546e7e6a35c9fcee0d0ccb6c042a9aeb5d, 6.12.109, 6.18.50, 6.7, 7.1 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 7.1 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: fix user path of nested backing files backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing file from user_file->f_path. This is incorrect when user_file itself is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems, e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged directory of another. Since commit def3ae83da02 ("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path") the f_path of a backing file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that the user opened. Commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") fixed this for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from ovl_open_realfile(). However, commit 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") changed the first argument of backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and derived the path from user_file->f_path again, silently re-introducing the problem. As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong path in /proc/<pid>/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records. For example, with two nested overlayfs mounts: mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested echo hello > /ovl/lower/foo mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \ /ovl/merged # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/ovl/lower /ovl/nested mapping /ovl/nested/foo shows a disconnected path instead of the user path: # readlink /proc/self/fd/3 /ovl/nested/foo # grep foo /proc/self/maps 7f6e2c100000-7f6e2c101000 r--s 00000000 00:24 15813027 /foo The bogus path is derived from the f_path of the intermediate backing file, whose mount is a private clone that d_path() cannot resolve. Fix this by using file_user_path(), which returns the outermost user-visible path for backing files and falls back to &user_file->f_path for regular files. This restores the behavior of commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") for overlayfs and also fixes the same problem for the other backing_file_open() callers, fuse passthrough and erofs ishare, when their user file is itself a backing file. backing_tmpfile_open() has the same pattern but is not affected: it is only called by ovl_create_tmpfile() for the upper layer, and another overlayfs is rejected as upperdir by the DCACHE_OP_REAL check in ovl_mount_dir_check(), so its user_file can never be a backing file.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.