Answer in brief
CVE-2026-90044 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix Use-After-Free in AIO error path. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=de2080d41b5d584205e408d72021f0f335a046fc <153b5ecd29ed055562400bc17c91df3fd869b0ce || >=de2080d41b5d584205e408d72021f0f335a046fc <4a2fb2d12b87b43724230abb52a1440617c7b6cc || >=de2080d41b5d584205e408d72021f0f335a046fc <e78dcb1f7ec271449c54984dc90c62a5ba272de7 | 153b5ecd29ed055562400bc17c91df3fd869b0ce, 4a2fb2d12b87b43724230abb52a1440617c7b6cc, e78dcb1f7ec271449c54984dc90c62a5ba272de7 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 16, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix Use-After-Free in AIO error path In ffs_epfile_write_iter() and ffs_epfile_read_iter(), when ffs_epfile_io() fails with an error other than -EIOCBQUEUED, the io_data structure (`p`) is freed. However, for AIO operations, the kiocb cancel function was already armed and kiocb->private was set to `p`. If a concurrent cancel operation (such as sys_io_cancel()) executes after ffs_epfile_io() fails but before the function frees `p`, a Use-After-Free can occur when the cancellation handler accesses the freed pointer. To securely fix this race condition, we must properly un-arm the cancellation. Invoking `kiocb->ki_complete()` does exactly this by acquiring `ctx->ctx_lock` and safely removing the kiocb from the active sequence. In doing so, it ensures that a parallel io_cancel can no longer discover the kiocb, effectively closing the race window. We then return -EIOCBQUEUED to notify the VFS layer that the kiocb has been consumed and it should avoid attempting to complete the request again or triggering subsequent completion handlers.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.