Answer in brief
CVE-2026-90089 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e <a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393 || >=998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e <22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354 || >=998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e <060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d | a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393, 22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354, 060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.15 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 17, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length nxp_process_fw_dump() pulls the ACL header off the frame and then reads seq_num and buf_len from a struct nxp_fw_dump_hdr placed at skb->data, without checking that the ACL payload is long enough to contain it. h4_recv_buf() collects HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE bytes of header followed by the number of payload bytes named in that header, so skb->len is 4 + dlen with dlen supplied by the controller and possibly smaller than the 8 byte dump header, or zero. A short frame with connection handle 0xfff therefore reads both fields from beyond the received data. Beyond the read itself, buf_len is what terminates a dump: a value of zero makes the driver call hci_devcd_complete() and reset the controller, so a truncated frame can end a dump early. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and pull the FW dump header before accessing its fields. Warn and reject the chunk if the header is truncated.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.