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Copyright ยฉ 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity ยท Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-90200

fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validationCVE-2026-90200

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-90200 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 17, 2026Updated Oct 30, 2026Source checked Nov 1, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 17, 2026Material review Oct 30, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28 || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a2f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28, 805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd, dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b, 169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af, c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a2
Linux/Linuxgeneric5.15Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <8ecb1525a9520acd3d5ea3e2593e487fd9f143ce || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28 || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a28ecb1525a9520acd3d5ea3e2593e487fd9f143ce, f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28, 805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd, dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b, 169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af, c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a2

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28; Linux/Linux to 8ecb1525a9520acd3d5ea3e2593e487fd9f143ce if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Sep 17, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 30, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 17, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation In ntfs_init_from_boot(), the boot sector's MFT cluster numbers are validated against the volume size with: if (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors || mlcn2 * sct_per_clst >= sectors) goto out; mlcn and mlcn2 are u64 fields read directly from the boot sector. sct_per_clst is bounded above by 4096 (true_sectors_per_clst() plus the is_power_of_2() check below it), but the multiplication is done in u64 and wraps when mlcn (or mlcn2) is large enough -- e.g. mlcn near 2^62 with sct_per_clst == 4 wraps to 0, which compares below any non-zero 'sectors', so the check is bypassed and the malformed record is accepted. The accepted mlcn is then used unchanged in sbi->mft.lbo = mlcn << cluster_bits; In practice the resulting reads fail at the block layer (sb_bread() returns NULL via grow_buffers()'s check_mul_overflow() guard), so today this manifests as mount failing in odd places rather than as something more dangerous, but the validation step is still wrong and there is no reason for callers to rely on the block layer to catch a value that should never have been accepted in the first place. Use check_mul_overflow() to compute the two sector positions and fail the mount if either multiplication wraps; this preserves the existing semantics (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors) instead of switching to division (mlcn >= sectors / sct_per_clst), which would tighten the check at edge cases where 'sectors' is not a multiple of sct_per_clst. The check_*_overflow() style is the one ntfs3 already uses for similar on-disk arithmetic in fs/ntfs3/run.c.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Nov 1, 2026
References
6 linked sources
Open source record