Answer in brief
CVE-2026-90200 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28 || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af || >=82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 <c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a2 | f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28, 805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd, dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b, 169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af, c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a2 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.15 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 17, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation In ntfs_init_from_boot(), the boot sector's MFT cluster numbers are validated against the volume size with: if (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors || mlcn2 * sct_per_clst >= sectors) goto out; mlcn and mlcn2 are u64 fields read directly from the boot sector. sct_per_clst is bounded above by 4096 (true_sectors_per_clst() plus the is_power_of_2() check below it), but the multiplication is done in u64 and wraps when mlcn (or mlcn2) is large enough -- e.g. mlcn near 2^62 with sct_per_clst == 4 wraps to 0, which compares below any non-zero 'sectors', so the check is bypassed and the malformed record is accepted. The accepted mlcn is then used unchanged in sbi->mft.lbo = mlcn << cluster_bits; In practice the resulting reads fail at the block layer (sb_bread() returns NULL via grow_buffers()'s check_mul_overflow() guard), so today this manifests as mount failing in odd places rather than as something more dangerous, but the validation step is still wrong and there is no reason for callers to rely on the block layer to catch a value that should never have been accepted in the first place. Use check_mul_overflow() to compute the two sector positions and fail the mount if either multiplication wraps; this preserves the existing semantics (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors) instead of switching to division (mlcn >= sectors / sct_per_clst), which would tighten the check at edge cases where 'sectors' is not a multiple of sct_per_clst. The check_*_overflow() style is the one ntfs3 already uses for similar on-disk arithmetic in fs/ntfs3/run.c.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.