Answer in brief
CVE-2026-90370 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound TLV walk in mt7996_mcu_get_chip_config. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=5d33053be609abfcfa9f5ca75d5554f2109aa40b <3106f62809d45c1e6aadfad1f4d7c3f74cd53a96 || >=5d33053be609abfcfa9f5ca75d5554f2109aa40b <39aa6b853b6d69dd1fee3507efdb3c277b7c53e6 || >=5d33053be609abfcfa9f5ca75d5554f2109aa40b <d0bb2189ade617e624f3c8f444ebb05f59bb2524 || >=5d33053be609abfcfa9f5ca75d5554f2109aa40b <93eaddfdd35aa6bfe570c087db4e97fb9d8a791a || >=5d33053be609abfcfa9f5ca75d5554f2109aa40b <44af52467e72094351a362bf69effd52f1d9c186 | 3106f62809d45c1e6aadfad1f4d7c3f74cd53a96, 39aa6b853b6d69dd1fee3507efdb3c277b7c53e6, d0bb2189ade617e624f3c8f444ebb05f59bb2524, 93eaddfdd35aa6bfe570c087db4e97fb9d8a791a, 44af52467e72094351a362bf69effd52f1d9c186 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 17, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound TLV walk in mt7996_mcu_get_chip_config The response TLV loop advanced by tlv->len without a minimum, so a theoretical firmware response containing a zero-length TLV could spin forever, hanging the CPU during device probe. The u32 payload was also read without bounds checking. Reject a short fixed field, stop on a TLV whose length underruns the header or overruns the skb.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.