Answer in brief
CVE-2026-91006 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Apache Karaf: OS Command Injection in Child-Instance Launch (instance:* / InstancesMBean). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Apache Software Foundation/Apache Karaf (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Apache Software Foundation/Apache Karaf (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation/Apache Karafgeneric | >=0 <4.4.12 | 4.4.12 |
Published upstream
Sep 28, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 28, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 28, 2026
Apache Karaf's instance-management service (InstanceServiceImpl) builds the command line used to launch a child Karaf JVM by string concatenation, then executes it through /bin/sh (Unix) or cscript (Windows). The caller-supplied javaOpts value is spliced into that string unquoted. A javaOpts value containing shell metacharacters (;, |, `, $(...)) is interpreted by the shell instead of being passed to the JVM as an option, giving arbitrary OS command execution as the Karaf process user. Reachable via the shell commands instance:create, instance:start, instance:restart, instance:change-opts, and the equivalent InstanceMBean JMX operations (createInstance, startInstance, changeJavaOpts, cloneInstance). Mitigation * Set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties to close the fail-open gap for all unconfigured command scopes. * Restrict which principals can reach instance:* commands and InstancesMBean via etc/users.properties role assignments. * Treat javaOpts passed to instance:create/instance:start/instance:change-opts/InstancesMBean as untrusted input only from fully-trusted operators.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.