Answer in brief
CVE-2026-91129 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.4) vulnerability in Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps home-assistant/core (generic), homeassistant (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps home-assistant/core (generic), homeassistant (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| home-assistant/coregeneric | <2026.2.3 | 2026.2.3 |
| homeassistantpip | <2026.2.2 | 2026.2.3 |
Published upstream
Sep 22, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 22, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 22, 2026
Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.