Answer in brief
CVE-2026-92915 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in WWBN AVideo userVerifyEmail.php Unauthenticated Access Control. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps WWBN/AVideo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps WWBN/AVideo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| WWBN/AVideogeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 17, 2026
WWBN AVideo through commit e01e41ecc (no patched version available) contains a broken access control flaw in objects/userVerifyEmail.php. The script disables the login requirement ($global['ignoreUserMustBeLoggedIn'] = 1), takes users_id directly from the query string, and calls User::sendVerificationLink() with no session requirement, no CSRF/global token, no relationship check between caller and target, and no enforceRateLimit() call. The only intended throttle is keyed to the caller's own session, so cookie-less requests are never limited. An unauthenticated remote attacker can therefore cause an arbitrary number of verification emails to be sent to any account ID, and can enumerate accounts and their verification status from the three distinct JSON responses ("Verification Sent", "Already verified", "Unknown error"). In addition, createVerificationCode() invokes $user->setRecoverPass() and saves the user, so each anonymous request writes a live password-recovery token onto the targeted account; that token is embedded in base64 in the verification link emailed to the account owner and is accepted by objects/userRecoverPassSave.json.php as the credential for setting a new password.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.