MISP Blocklist Workflow Module: Arbitrary Script Execution via Unrestricted File Extension

The MISP blocklist workflow module accepted a user-supplied blocklist filename parameter without validating the file extension. The only sanitization applied was basename() to strip path components and a check for empty or dot values. A site administrator could specify a filename with an arbitrary extension that would be placed in the MISP export directory. If the underlying web server is configured to interpret and execute scripts from that directory, the resulting file could be invoked, leading to arbitrary code execution in the context of the web server process. The vulnerability requires the attacker to hold site-administrator privileges within MISP, as the blocklist workflow module is restricted to that role. No additional user interaction is required beyond triggering the workflow action with a crafted filename parameter. The impact is full compromise of the MISP server's confidentiality, integrity, and availability, as arbitrary script execution grants the attacker the same privileges as the web server user. Version affected: <2.5.47

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.