Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade (CVE-2026-95625) | HOL Guard CVE

Medium · CVSS 5.9CVE-2026-95625

Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-95625 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.9) vulnerability in Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Tauri/tauri-plugin-updater (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 23, 2026Updated Sep 23, 2026Source checked Sep 23, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 23, 2026Material review Sep 23, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Medium · CVSS 5.9
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 5.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Tauri/tauri-plugin-updater (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
Tauri/tauri-plugin-updatergeneric	>=2.0.0 <2.12.0 \|\| >=2.12.0 <=*	2.12.0

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Tauri/tauri-plugin-updater.
Review the reported fix. Update Tauri/tauri-plugin-updater to 2.12.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Sep 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Sep 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Sep 23, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Upstream source description

The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.