Answer in brief
CVE-2026-96454 records a High severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in Pake grants unrestricted IPC access to every HTTPS origin loaded in generated applications. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps tw93/Pake (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps tw93/Pake (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| tw93/Pakegeneric | >=0 <=3.17.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 23, 2026
Pake turns a website into a desktop application built on Tauri. Every application it generates inherits two settings from the upstream template, and together they hand native functionality to untrusted web content. The first is in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json, which grants IPC access with "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] }. That wildcard tells Tauri to accept IPC from any HTTPS origin, not just the site the application was built to wrap. The second is "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, which puts window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() in reach of ordinary page JavaScript. Tauri's access control list only checks plugin commands, the ones prefixed with plugin:. Commands the application registers itself through generate_handler!, known as app commands, are never checked against the ACL. So once an origin holds IPC access, it can call every app command with nothing else standing in the way. Pake registers download_file as an app command, and it does not appear in the permissions list because it does not need to. The practical effect is that any script running on any HTTPS page inside a Pake application can invoke the application's native commands. That includes third-party script the wrapped site loads on its own, such as analytics, advertising, or a compromised CDN. Anyone distributing their own Pake application gets the same access without asking for it. Chained with the path traversal in download_file that is tracked separately as CVE-2026-82635, this reaches arbitrary file write and persistent code execution.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.