Answer in brief
CVE-2026-97437 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <ed6da1abeec50db9060d714f03743fe0b63e4fe4 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <6a8149a20e46086c756c2a9202e377c0b649a0c3 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <aa1bdbb39f49c5bc9779316891c40005517842a5 || >=0 <6.12.111 || >=0 <6.18.53 | ed6da1abeec50db9060d714f03743fe0b63e4fe4, 6a8149a20e46086c756c2a9202e377c0b649a0c3, aa1bdbb39f49c5bc9779316891c40005517842a5, 6.12.111, 6.18.53 |
Published upstream
Sep 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 25, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e() The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a character count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME header size: if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size)) This computes: name_len + 16 > e_size The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each): sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) + name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used in the readdir path. A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size but large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary. Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup path.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.