Answer in brief
CVE-2026-98184 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in wifi: mwifiex: prevent authentication frame length truncation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=36995892c271cce5e2230bc165a06f109b117222 <25c45a2075cc00faed45f92a64bb172fb074a2ee || >=36995892c271cce5e2230bc165a06f109b117222 <5747eaa38a7fcad48be2fd910b65008198b2b06c || >=36995892c271cce5e2230bc165a06f109b117222 <877b61a67d5eb3e616478daf3908114b57feff1e || >=36995892c271cce5e2230bc165a06f109b117222 <fa00193eb991f92b007aefe7afb6a7566976dacf | 25c45a2075cc00faed45f92a64bb172fb074a2ee, 5747eaa38a7fcad48be2fd910b65008198b2b06c, 877b61a67d5eb3e616478daf3908114b57feff1e, fa00193eb991f92b007aefe7afb6a7566976dacf |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.12 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 6, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: prevent authentication frame length truncation mwifiex_cfg80211_authenticate() derives the authentication frame length from req->ie_len and req->auth_data_len, both of type size_t, but stores it in a u16. NL80211_ATTR_AUTH_DATA only has a minimum length policy. Since nla_len is a u16, a single attribute can carry up to 65531 bytes of payload, so the sum can exceed U16_MAX before it is assigned to pkt_len. The truncated pkt_len determines the skb frame area, while the copy length remains req->auth_data_len - 4, resulting in a heap buffer overflow. For example, with auth_data_len equal to 65510 and no IEs, the sum is 65546. It is truncated to 10 and then reduced by four to 6. The driver appends only six bytes to the skb with skb_put(), but then copies 65506 user-provided bytes into the authentication body. Reaching this path requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the user namespace owning the network namespace, an up station netdev, and a suitable BSS/SAE authentication request. Compute the length in size_t, reject values that cannot be represented by the firmware's u16 frame length field, and only then assign it to pkt_len.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.