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Copyright ยฉ 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity ยท Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-98377

vlan: require the MAC header to be present in __vlan_insert_inner_tag()CVE-2026-98377

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-98377 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in vlan: require the MAC header to be present in __vlan_insert_inner_tag(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 9, 2026Updated Oct 21, 2026Source checked Oct 25, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 9, 2026Material review Oct 21, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <40a5cc4b7251c74f3341332a226d02200e96bccf || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <f42562dd027dc4ed103fae17b2206e73ea1963c4 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <59af43ccece4d2d8b62e9e3ccc96b6e2e793bcdc || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <ab888242fce4f16f6c4d4c6ec53939ad36aa3b3a40a5cc4b7251c74f3341332a226d02200e96bccf, f42562dd027dc4ed103fae17b2206e73ea1963c4, 59af43ccece4d2d8b62e9e3ccc96b6e2e793bcdc, ab888242fce4f16f6c4d4c6ec53939ad36aa3b3a
Linux/Linuxgeneric2.6.12Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <3d531429524df2c7116579306640283fea68bcf0 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <40a5cc4b7251c74f3341332a226d02200e96bccf || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <f42562dd027dc4ed103fae17b2206e73ea1963c4 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <59af43ccece4d2d8b62e9e3ccc96b6e2e793bcdc || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <ab888242fce4f16f6c4d4c6ec53939ad36aa3b3a3d531429524df2c7116579306640283fea68bcf0, 40a5cc4b7251c74f3341332a226d02200e96bccf, f42562dd027dc4ed103fae17b2206e73ea1963c4, 59af43ccece4d2d8b62e9e3ccc96b6e2e793bcdc, ab888242fce4f16f6c4d4c6ec53939ad36aa3b3a

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 40a5cc4b7251c74f3341332a226d02200e96bccf; Linux/Linux to 3d531429524df2c7116579306640283fea68bcf0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 9, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 21, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 9, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: require the MAC header to be present in __vlan_insert_inner_tag() __vlan_insert_inner_tag() only guarantees head room via skb_cow_head(), never that mac_len bytes of MAC header are present. Its ETH_HLEN wrappers - __vlan_insert_tag() under skb_vlan_push(), and vlan_insert_tag() under validate_xmit_vlan() on the generic transmit path - therefore rewrite the first 16 bytes at skb->data: a 12-byte memmove plus two 2-byte stores at +12 and +14. No caller supplies the bound, while the pop helpers use skb_ensure_writable()/pskb_may_pull(). An IFF_TUN device has hard_header_len == 0, so packet_snd() accepts a one-byte AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW frame. The first vlan push only sets a hwaccel tag; the next - clsact "action vlan push" or bpf_skb_vlan_push() - enters the helper with skb->len still 1. The head comes from skbuff_small_head without __GFP_ZERO, so each push drags bytes from beyond skb->tail into the frame. After three the one-byte send leaves as 13 bytes carrying 11 bytes of uninitialised slab: 0000: 5a b3 62 12 80 88 ff ff 00 b3 62 12 81 `------------------------------' only 0x5a was sent; the rest is slab, here the top 56 bits of a linear-map address Require the MAC header the helper rewrites to be present, so such a frame is dropped rather than transmitted.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 25, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record