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Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity · Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-98406

wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driverCVE-2026-98406

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-98406 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 14, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Oct 25, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 14, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <4ba86c44b2fcb1c3175caa2456b6d58f483446ab || >=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <4095b66acae9893dd13deb39a4331651cb2f822b || >=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <c2cd9c44777cf97be3e35c10b7c2d8f59ebb9306 || >=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <0d1700394e9f5d0bd9bebad8d5a50edf983f52fd || >=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <7978dda63d2b109ea9c3f7a096cd1aac6542cd54 || >=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <432c8532d5ccc2af77da43ed6ef1c80495a4efe8 || >=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <c4ee5685af444024e6222ce29f6ed36adc44ffc3 || >=554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979 <da2ca406f45a6e21760243152ed8d2e8e72915c24ba86c44b2fcb1c3175caa2456b6d58f483446ab, 4095b66acae9893dd13deb39a4331651cb2f822b, c2cd9c44777cf97be3e35c10b7c2d8f59ebb9306, 0d1700394e9f5d0bd9bebad8d5a50edf983f52fd, 7978dda63d2b109ea9c3f7a096cd1aac6542cd54, 432c8532d5ccc2af77da43ed6ef1c80495a4efe8, c4ee5685af444024e6222ce29f6ed36adc44ffc3, da2ca406f45a6e21760243152ed8d2e8e72915c2
Linux/Linuxgeneric3.5Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 4ba86c44b2fcb1c3175caa2456b6d58f483446ab if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 14, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 14, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver. When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails. When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear. Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not in driver. This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking. [also add second syzbot report]

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 25, 2026
References
8 linked sources
Open source record