Answer in brief
CVE-2026-98440 records a High severity (CVSS 7.0) vulnerability in KVM: arm64: nv: Delay freeing of shadow S2 structures until VM destruction. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=4f128f8e1aaac189f83d0f828bcdb2986d8d2e51 <876049f026b4dfaca0cc78ec81be0e639ca8525d || >=4f128f8e1aaac189f83d0f828bcdb2986d8d2e51 <22e82acec93a681071ed36f70eabe2d0c4e0bebd || >=4f128f8e1aaac189f83d0f828bcdb2986d8d2e51 <5bf1c9175e657b3c2dc1cf77403031ac7aadcf66 || >=4f128f8e1aaac189f83d0f828bcdb2986d8d2e51 <e5843f4effaa2ffac3e789ecd4456403564961d4 | 876049f026b4dfaca0cc78ec81be0e639ca8525d, 22e82acec93a681071ed36f70eabe2d0c4e0bebd, 5bf1c9175e657b3c2dc1cf77403031ac7aadcf66, e5843f4effaa2ffac3e789ecd4456403564961d4 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.11 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: nv: Delay freeing of shadow S2 structures until VM destruction We free the shadow S2 structures from kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(), which is a Bad Idea(tm). Freeing the page tables is fair game (this is what this callback is for), but freeing the container that could still be referenced by another part of the system is not great. Instead, grow separate destructors that gets called when we tear the VM down for good. From there, we can nuke both the individual MMUs as well as the global array that points to them, safe in the knowledge that the vcpus themselves have been destroyed already.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.