Answer in brief
CVE-2026-98449 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in smb: client: delete compound mids on send failure before unlock. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=ee258d79159afed52ca9372aeb9c1a51e89b32ee <70783946f3b5d0c06ec7df0f5e7bec2bfad24efb || >=ee258d79159afed52ca9372aeb9c1a51e89b32ee <8f6f8a48399f82f4a83f7b9f25b9707e0062a4f9 || 3c57a0be487088b08d9c88998f911eb4a7ba36e4 || >=4.20.11 <4.21 | 70783946f3b5d0c06ec7df0f5e7bec2bfad24efb, 8f6f8a48399f82f4a83f7b9f25b9707e0062a4f9, 4.21 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: delete compound mids on send failure before unlock When sending a compound request fails, smb_send_rqst() kicks off a reconnect. compound_send_recv() still has those mids on pending_mid_q, but it unlocks the server without removing them first. During reconnect, cifs_abort_connection() walks pending_mid_q and runs each mid callback. With no response yet, those callbacks return credits and drop in_flight. Then compound_send_recv()'s send-error path returns the same credits again. in_flight ends up decremented twice and smb2_add_credits() WARNs. syzbot hits this during SMB2_negotiate when the socket send fails. cifs_call_async() already calls delete_mid() before unlock on send failure. Do the same for compound chains and set cancelled_mid[] so the out: path does not delete them again.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.