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Copyright ยฉ 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity ยท Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-98826

rtc: ac100: Fix clock provider use-after-free on probe failureCVE-2026-98826

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-98826 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in rtc: ac100: Fix clock provider use-after-free on probe failure. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 18, 2026Updated Oct 18, 2026Source checked Oct 18, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 18, 2026Material review Oct 18, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=d00a18a42c1483924de086ddfb0efe8da1dba3ac <12bcd20d76703ee2baf52224d287b7fea096b12f || >=d00a18a42c1483924de086ddfb0efe8da1dba3ac <9cff19ddd7f90c1f572a0f83cfc41de8f8dcbcd8 || >=d00a18a42c1483924de086ddfb0efe8da1dba3ac <55ca60ba336632349f7c4585d22ba74ae355b7ce || >=d00a18a42c1483924de086ddfb0efe8da1dba3ac <fcf0b58e976e83adf246b014518e49c662b96f5e12bcd20d76703ee2baf52224d287b7fea096b12f, 9cff19ddd7f90c1f572a0f83cfc41de8f8dcbcd8, 55ca60ba336632349f7c4585d22ba74ae355b7ce, fcf0b58e976e83adf246b014518e49c662b96f5e
Linux/Linuxgeneric4.9Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 12bcd20d76703ee2baf52224d287b7fea096b12f if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 18, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 18, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 18, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtc: ac100: Fix clock provider use-after-free on probe failure ac100_rtc_register_clks() registers the RTC-32k clock with clk_hw_register_fixed_rate() and the clock provider with of_clk_add_hw_provider(). Neither is device managed, and both are released only from ac100_rtc_remove(). The driver core does not call remove() when probe() fails: really_probe() reaches probe_failed below the device_remove() call and goes straight to releasing the device's managed resources. ac100_rtc_probe() ends with return devm_rtc_register_device(chip->rtc); so if that fails after the clocks have been registered, the provider is left on the global of_clk_providers list holding chip->clk_data, which was allocated with devm_kzalloc() and is freed while probe() unwinds. A later lookup on this device tree node then reads freed memory in of_clk_hw_onecell_get(). Consumers that do exactly that exist in tree: the wifi power sequence nodes on sun8i-a83t-bananapi-m3 and sun8i-a83t-cubietruck-plus take <&ac100_rtc 1>, and the sun9i-a80 boards route osc32k through <&ac100_rtc 0>. The window is narrow, as devm_rtc_register_device() can only fail with -ENOMEM here, but the provider is left dangling whenever it does. The RTC-32k clock is leaked on the same path. Since clk_core_lookup() searches a global list that is not scoped per device, __clk_register() rejects the duplicate name with -EEXIST, so the leak also makes a later probe of the same device fail. The error path that returns -EINVAL when the ADDA 4M parent clock cannot be found leaks the RTC-32k clock in the same way. No provider has been registered at that point, so that one is a leak rather than a use-after-free. Register both with devm_clk_hw_register_fixed_rate() and devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider() so that they are released whenever the device goes away, on a failed probe as well as on unbind. Devres releases in reverse order of acquisition, so the provider is removed before chip->clk_data is freed, and the clkout children are now unregistered before their parent rather than after it. ac100_rtc_unregister_clks() and the remove callback then have nothing left to do and are removed.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • block: reject polled dio with user integrity metadataSame linux/linux package
  • wifi: mac80211: prevent AP VLAN tx from other interfacesSame linux/linux package
  • wifi: cfg80211: preserve hidden-group beacon IE ownershipSame linux/linux package
  • wifi: mac80211: validate TX status rate metadataSame linux/linux package
  • rtc: mpfs: fix unchecked devm_clk_get() error pointer in probe()Same linux/linux package
  • wifi: ath9k_htc: bound TX aggregation to MAX_TX_BUF_SIZESame linux/linux package

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 18, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record