Answer in brief
CVE-2026-99010 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Bluetooth: RFCOMM: free the skb when the DLC has no owner. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <a54ce160e3ef7e50ec94e0ac4131c3d0f9f739b9 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <c3f76b025cbbb0ab47310dbe7de18092d89f2a99 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <4f46de658ce61968aef5ea7ae809d1c180330544 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <b8814161b14c610b7a09527433301d8ad8180aef || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <9d1afbf60ed53c5b051cd124153e0ae3078c8b93 | a54ce160e3ef7e50ec94e0ac4131c3d0f9f739b9, c3f76b025cbbb0ab47310dbe7de18092d89f2a99, 4f46de658ce61968aef5ea7ae809d1c180330544, b8814161b14c610b7a09527433301d8ad8180aef, 9d1afbf60ed53c5b051cd124153e0ae3078c8b93 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.12 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 23, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: free the skb when the DLC has no owner rfcomm_recv_data() hands the skb to d->data_ready() and returns 0 without freeing it, so the callback owns the skb from that point on. The tty implementation frees it when the DLC has been detached from its device: static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner; if (!dev) { kfree_skb(skb); return; } The socket implementation returns without freeing it, and the skb is leaked. A connected DLC can have no owner: rfcomm_sock_destruct() clears d->owner, while the DLC itself stays on the session until it is closed. Data frames that arrive in that window still find d->state == BT_CONNECTED in rfcomm_recv_data() and are handed to the callback, one leaked skb each. The leak does not stop on its own either. The remote runs out of credits only once RFCOMM_RX_THROTTLED is set, and for a socket the only place that sets it is rfcomm_sk_data_ready() itself, below the return. rfcomm_process_dlcs() keeps granting credits, so the remote keeps sending and the leak keeps growing. Free the skb, as the tty side does.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.