Answer in brief
CVE-2026-99018 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=d1584d791a297aa8ed93503382a682a6ecfc4218 <6639735367a7d491977e9e5e7afc50b489d81d83 || >=d1584d791a297aa8ed93503382a682a6ecfc4218 <7d1367a53137e379498eb8791295e58854378636 || >=d1584d791a297aa8ed93503382a682a6ecfc4218 <37b4401ee6fa06046446d55e97e8d11784080843 || >=d1584d791a297aa8ed93503382a682a6ecfc4218 <4d0697f192975dab5985e921989be1d85cf580e9 | 6639735367a7d491977e9e5e7afc50b489d81d83, 7d1367a53137e379498eb8791295e58854378636, 37b4401ee6fa06046446d55e97e8d11784080843, 4d0697f192975dab5985e921989be1d85cf580e9 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.7 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 23, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: beq \prev, tp, _skip_scs scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register. A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (¤t) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place. Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted "sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then write to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive. The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload is skipped on every subsequent entry as well. Decide "came from userspace" from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later. SPP is written by hardware on trap entry and cannot be forged from U-mode. Legitimate behaviour is unchanged: user entries (SPP=0) reload the task shadow call stack, nested kernel entries (SPP=1) skip it.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.