Answer in brief
CVE-2026-99059 records a High severity (CVSS 7.7) vulnerability in wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295 || >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04 || >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a || >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20 || >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e | fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295, c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04, 4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a, 3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20, d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.6 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 23, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.