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Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity · Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-99092

riscv: patch: fix handling of bpf-jit execmem addressesCVE-2026-99092

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-99092 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in riscv: patch: fix handling of bpf-jit execmem addresses. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 26, 2026Updated Oct 26, 2026Source checked Oct 26, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 26, 2026Material review Oct 26, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f <562a35b9e0b3d9483d9472995219cadb3592db3d || >=2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f <9e8fc7972b398e9dc2415ece283d8f64edac3858 || >=2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f <f71d6ea3843c8038c431c2699482f246aea37ca0 || >=2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f <a510e1ae8c9030750c2edf7b0bc9b186cd8c7a06562a35b9e0b3d9483d9472995219cadb3592db3d, 9e8fc7972b398e9dc2415ece283d8f64edac3858, f71d6ea3843c8038c431c2699482f246aea37ca0, a510e1ae8c9030750c2edf7b0bc9b186cd8c7a06
Linux/Linuxgeneric6.10Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 562a35b9e0b3d9483d9472995219cadb3592db3d if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 26, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 26, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 26, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: patch: fix handling of bpf-jit execmem addresses Commit 8718e5a3090b ("riscv: patch: skip fixmap mapping when kernel text is already writable") gated the core_kernel_text() branch of patch_map() on CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, and explicitly left the vmalloc branch unchanged. That branch has a separate problem. That branch only creates a temporary writable fixmap alias when CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, and otherwise assumes the target is directly writable and returns the address unchanged. That assumption no longer holds: bpf_prog_pack_alloc calls set_memory_rox() on every pack unconditionally in alloc_new_pack(), independently of any CONFIG_STRICT_*_RWX option, so BPF text in the vmalloc area is read-only regardless of what CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX says. With CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n, patch_map() returns the read-only address directly, the subsequent copy_to_kernel_nofault() takes a page fault and returns -EFAULT. bpf_arch_text_copy() turns that into -EINVAL, which propagates through bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() to the WARN_ON() in bpf_int_jit_compile() and leaves the program un-JITed. Note that BPF cannot be fixed the way kprobes was in commit bdc46e507b59 ("riscv: mm: make EXECMEM_KPROBES writable without CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX"). EXECMEM_BPF is already PAGE_KERNEL, i.e. writable at allocation time; the read-only mapping is established afterwards by generic code in alloc_new_pack(), which arch code cannot influence. The only place this can be handled is patch_map(). This is the same problem that was fixed on arm64 by commit b1480ed230ac ("arm64: patching: fix handling of execmem addresses"), and the fix is the same: CONFIG_EXECMEM is what actually tracks whether the vmalloc area can hold executable memory that needs a temporary alias to be written. CONFIG_BPF_JIT, CONFIG_KPROBES and CONFIG_MODULES all select it. Note that this is not limited to CONFIG_MODULES=n. Unlike arm64, riscv selects CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX, so CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX can be disabled with CONFIG_MODULES=y as well, and the bug is reachable in that configuration too. The !CONFIG_MMU build is unaffected: it has its own __patch_insn_set() and __patch_insn_write() implementations and never calls patch_map().

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 26, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record