Answer in brief
CVE-2026-99278 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in ksmbd: limit sessions on each connection. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=d7fd1f98607f2cd358e583f9548bdf0173090a86 <94f8462fc9d5332bc54e91605003c17381e9171a || >=d7fd1f98607f2cd358e583f9548bdf0173090a86 <dc6aa1ba8b7fff8800ad9bf143f17d308e02ec68 || c99ea7855124ca1428a1e59c2b4590aaef34eacf || >=7.2.8 <7.3 | 94f8462fc9d5332bc54e91605003c17381e9171a, dc6aa1ba8b7fff8800ad9bf143f17d308e02ec68, 7.3 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 7.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Nov 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 7, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: limit sessions on each connection The pending setup limit only counts InProgress sessions. A client can complete authentication repeatedly and retain an unbounded number of Valid sessions on one connection. Reserve a connection slot before allocating a session and retain a connection reference while authentication is in progress. The first SMB3 channel takes over that reservation; binding to another connection reserves one slot there. Reauthentication and authentication continuation reuse the existing reservation. Return slots on allocation or insertion failure, channel removal, and final session destruction. Accept max_sessions_per_connection in reserved startup-request space and default to 64 when older tools leave it zero. Keep the request size and existing field offsets unchanged. Expose the configured limit in procfs. The existing connection limits bound the aggregate number of sessions without a separate global session allocation limit.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.