Answer in brief
CVE-2026-109516 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in Bot for Telegram on WooCommerce <= 1.3.0 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass to Account Takeover via Fake Telegram Webhook + Brute-Forced Login Token. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps guruteam/Bot for Telegram on WooCommerce (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps guruteam/Bot for Telegram on WooCommerce (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| guruteam/Bot for Telegram on WooCommercegeneric | >=0 <=1.3.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 29, 2026
The Bot for Telegram on WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0. The `/wp-json/woo-telegram/v1/main/` REST endpoint is registered with `permission_callback => '__return_true'` and performs no Telegram webhook signature verification, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to POST a forged bot update with a `message.chat.id` set to any WordPress login name; `bftow_get_user_system_id()` resolves this attacker-supplied value to the targeted account via `get_user_by('login', $tgId)` with no ownership proof, and writes a login token computed as `md5($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] . time())` — both inputs are fully attacker-controlled or bounded within seconds using the response's own `Date` header. The resulting token is redeemable at the unauthenticated, capability-check-free, and nonce-less `?action=bftow_create_order&bftow_token=` endpoint, which calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` unconditionally via `login_user_by_id`, issuing a persistent authenticated session cookie for the targeted account to the attacker. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any WordPress user, including administrators, given only that user's username.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.