Answer in brief
CVE-2026-93757 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in Wild Apricot Login <= 1.0.18 - Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding on Multisite. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps wild-apricot/Wild Apricot Login (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps wild-apricot/Wild Apricot Login (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| wild-apricot/Wild Apricot Logingeneric | >=0 <=1.0.18 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 29, 2026
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.