Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43334 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43334 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <425a22c5373d4e1b46492ab869074ebeeade61f3 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <7ab69426e7ecbd18a222ee2ec87ca612d30197d7 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <01bb4045d2306c266178f49ce0c3576d237a3040 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <91649c02c1baaa18cedf7fb425fa1f0f852c8183 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <c8ff0ca6508535bccabd81c5c9dcc63de8a3d4fb || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <fa14e0e19820b1bbdb42185c9c4efa950bcffef9 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <ec17efb1ef91506cfd17a77692eaf4bbacb520ea || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <d05111bfe37bfd8bd4d2dfe6675d6bdeef43f7c7 | 425a22c5373d4e1b46492ab869074ebeeade61f3, 7ab69426e7ecbd18a222ee2ec87ca612d30197d7, 01bb4045d2306c266178f49ce0c3576d237a3040, 91649c02c1baaa18cedf7fb425fa1f0f852c8183, c8ff0ca6508535bccabd81c5c9dcc63de8a3d4fb, fa14e0e19820b1bbdb42185c9c4efa950bcffef9, ec17efb1ef91506cfd17a77692eaf4bbacb520ea, d05111bfe37bfd8bd4d2dfe6675d6bdeef43f7c7 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 3.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM. tk_request() then sees an auth value without SMP_AUTH_MITM and may select JUST_CFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing policy the responder already enforces. When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMP_AUTH_MITM in the response in both rsp.auth_req and auth. This keeps the responder auth bits and later method selection aligned.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <425a22c5373d4e1b46492ab869074ebeeade61f3 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <7ab69426e7ecbd18a222ee2ec87ca612d30197d7 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <01bb4045d2306c266178f49ce0c3576d237a3040 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <91649c02c1baaa18cedf7fb425fa1f0f852c8183 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <c8ff0ca6508535bccabd81c5c9dcc63de8a3d4fb || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <fa14e0e19820b1bbdb42185c9c4efa950bcffef9 || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <ec17efb1ef91506cfd17a77692eaf4bbacb520ea || >=2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 <d05111bfe37bfd8bd4d2dfe6675d6bdeef43f7c7 | 425a22c5373d4e1b46492ab869074ebeeade61f3, 7ab69426e7ecbd18a222ee2ec87ca612d30197d7, 01bb4045d2306c266178f49ce0c3576d237a3040, 91649c02c1baaa18cedf7fb425fa1f0f852c8183, c8ff0ca6508535bccabd81c5c9dcc63de8a3d4fb, fa14e0e19820b1bbdb42185c9c4efa950bcffef9, ec17efb1ef91506cfd17a77692eaf4bbacb520ea, d05111bfe37bfd8bd4d2dfe6675d6bdeef43f7c7 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 3.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM. tk_request() then sees an auth value without SMP_AUTH_MITM and may select JUST_CFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing policy the responder already enforces. When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMP_AUTH_MITM in the response in both rsp.auth_req and auth. This keeps the responder auth bits and later method selection aligned.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.