Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48074 records a Low severity (CVSS 2.7) vulnerability in OpenReception: Staff deletion removes pending invites cross-tenant by email match. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 2.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-reception/appointment-booking-softwaregeneric | < 1.0.6 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 6, 2026
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48074 records a Low severity (CVSS 2.7) vulnerability in OpenReception: Staff deletion removes pending invites cross-tenant by email match. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 2.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-reception/appointment-booking-softwaregeneric | < 1.0.6 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 6, 2026
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.