Answer in brief
CVE-2026-61652 records a High severity (CVSS 8.7) vulnerability in Zapros: Streaming decoders ignored the requested chunk size, allowing a single compressed response chunk to allocate unbounded memory (decompression bomb). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps kap-sh/zapros (generic), zapros (pip), zapros (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps kap-sh/zapros (generic), zapros (pip), zapros (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| kap-sh/zaprosgeneric | <0.14.0 | 0.14.0 |
| zaprospip | <0.14.0 | 0.14.0 |
| zaprospypi | >=0 <0.14.0 | 0.14.0 |
Published upstream
Sep 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 21, 2026
Zapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The issue affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size — explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default — to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. Version 0.14.0 contains a patch. Some workarounds are available. Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.